Libya has been in a constant state of unrest since France and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ousted longtime Libyan leader Moammar Gadaffi in 2011. Since then, various international partners and stakeholders, including the United Nations (UN) and NATO, have organised numerous international conferences to promote peace and stability among the several warring factions in the country.
Along these lines, France hosted a meeting with Libya’s four warring parties in 2018 to discuss measures to revive the country’s peace process. The UN-sanctioned meeting produced a draft agreement that called on Libya to hold elections by the end of 2018, reintegrate military forces via an Egypt-led security dialogue, support the adoption of a constitutional framework, and unify financial institutions. Just two weeks ago, France hosted another conference on the conflict, during which participants pushed for the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries from Libya—including French, Turkish, and Russian troops—and the smooth conduct of presidential elections on December 24 and legislative elections in January.
However, while France’s diplomatic methods to secure peace in Libya certainly match those of other Western actors and the UN, its motives and strategic manoeuvres are diametrically opposed and rooted in its economic interests in the oil-rich country. While the UN and NATO back the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj, France, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates support Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east. France’s duplicitous policy and its preference for a militarised response to the conflict to protect its energy interests have drawn into question its credibility as a responsible international actor and undermined its position as a peace broker. More concerningly, its actions have also complicated the peace process and fuelled further conflict between the various warring parties.
France has provided Haftar with resources, intelligence, money, weapons (including US-made anti-tank missiles), and training, and tried to legitimise him in the eyes of the international community. It has also sent secret agents, advisers, and troops to eastern Libya. Under former President François Hollande, with Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in tow, France repeatedly promoted Haftar as the next strongman of the country. These policies have continued under incumbent leader Emmanuel Macron, with Le Drian now serving as foreign minister.
French involvement has facilitated numerous war crimes by the LNA. Haftar’s forces have been accused of committing numerous war crimes, including torture, executions, and desecrating the bodies of opposing forces; these crimes have been documented by global rights groups such as Human Rights Watch.
Moreover, it is not as if France is not aware or concerned about how its actions may be perceived, which explains why it has continually and explicitly denied assisting Haftar, despite evidence proving otherwise. For instance, in 2012, the bodies of French agents were recovered from a helicopter crash in Benghazi.
Instead, it has sought to deflect blame to Turkey. For example, last year, France accused Turkey of harassing one of its ships in the Mediterranean, saying that its ship was merely trying to uphold the arms embargo to Libya. France further alleged that Turkey was trying to deliver arms to Tripoli-based GNA.
These attempts to redirect responsibility for the instability in Libya has done little to convince its partners and other international actors, however. For example. For instance, Matteo Salvini, the Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Matteo Salvini of Italy, a NATO partner, has said: “In Libya, France has no interest in stabilizing the situation, probably because it has oil interests that are opposed to those of Italy.”
Likewise, former Libyan Prime Minister and GNA leader Fayez al Sarraj has also criticised Macron for supporting Haftar, after details of French intelligence agents operating in the country emerged. Furthermore, Haftar himself has publicly acknowledged having received French assistance. He has previously said, “We consider France as a friend. This alliance was established with unprecedented cooperation between the two nations. France did a great job supporting us. France not only supported us but it was also the first country to side with us. They sided with us while other countries did not. They supplied intelligence and surveillance to us. They also sent advisors specialized in intelligence and reconnaissance.”
Yet, despite denying its involvement and angering its allies, France has been effusive in its support for the warlord and clear in its interest in transforming him into the legitimate leader of the country, as evidenced by how it insisted on inviting him to the 2018 summit in Paris. In fact, in March, Macron hosted Haftar for the fourth time in three years.
Ten years into its involvement in this conflict, it is clear that France’s role as a supposed broker of peace must be questioned, particularly in light of its continued support for a warlord who has now massacred thousands. Through its military and financial support for Haftar, France has greatly increased Haftar’s bargaining power and diplomatic clout. By giving Haftar a position of strength and promoting him as a legitimate alternative to the GNA, France has both left the GNA making demands that the LNA has no reason to accept and enabled Haftar to delay meaningful negotiations, given that he still sees a realistic path to victory, thereby prolonging the conflict. For instance, after the 2019 uprising in Tripoli, Fayez al-Sarraj said he would not negotiate with Haftar until he removes his forces and stop the assault on Tripoli, but Haftar has little motive to do so when there still exists a possibility, however small, of taking full control of the country.
Even if one were to naively assume that France’s support for Haftar is not guided by its energy interests but a desire for regional peace, then one only needs to look at the popular sport for French involvement in Libya, where a majority of citizens have turned against Paris, to ascertain the effectiveness of its strategy. After Haftar’s offensive strike on Tripoli in 2019, thousands of Libyans took to the streets by sporting trademark yellow vests to protest against France’s support for Haftar.
Given France’s apparent reluctance to withdraw its support for Haftar or at least push him more strongly to come to the negotiating table, it is hoped that the threat of an upcoming election in France will push Macron to adopt a different approach. The abject failure of its involvement in the Libya crisis is a huge blot on Macron’s foreign policy record and credentials, and could push him to change course.
France’s Role in the Libyan Conflict Has Severely Eroded its Image as Responsible Actor
France’s role as a supposed broker of peace must be questioned, particularly in light of its continued support for a warlord who has now massacred thousands.
November 26, 2021
IMAGE SOURCE: REUTERS