After seventeen years of war in Afghanistan, the United States under the Trump administration is finally accepting defeat and is accelerating its exit out of the worn-torn country. Desperate to end a conflict that has cost America thousands of lives and more than $2 trillion, the Americans hurriedly signed a “peace deal” with the Taliban as Trump plans to go back to the voters having fulfilled one of his campaign promises, ending one of the most unpopular “forever wars”.
The US’ impending exit has fuelled the return of the Taliban to the limelight, potentially spelling disaster for the Afghanistan government, minorities and women in the country. However, the imminent return of the Taliban into the political mainstream is terrible news for India as well. Unlike the US, which considers Al-Qaeda and newly formed ISIS-KP (Khorasan Province) as the biggest threats to neutralise before it pulls out of Afghanistan, India’s fears centre around the Taliban. The fear in New Delhi mainly centres around the legitimate possibility that, in a post-American order, a Pakistan-backed Taliban will gain legitimacy after a power-sharing agreement and that some of these radical groups will start filtering into Kashmir again.
There is also considerable anxiety with regards to India’s commercial and trade investment in the region. With India now actively operating the Chabahar port in Iran and Afghanistan being its pathway to Central Asian energy markets, a Pakistan-backed Taliban would pose a significant threat to Indian investment and infrastructure.
Till now, India’s main strategy has been to leverage the immense soft power and goodwill it has amassed over the years by providing economic aid and supporting rebuilding efforts in the country. In addition, New Delhi also relies on deep historical bonds, its staunch support of the elected Afghan government, which is strengthened by its refusal to officially engage with the Taliban.
However, having sent no soldiers to Afghanistan and after it was left out of the US-brokered peace agreement, India’s influence is evidently subordinate to that of the US and Pakistan. In light of this, several international actors have urged India to initiate dialogue with the Taliban. For example, Alice Wells, the former Ambassador to Jordan and US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad also recommended that India should directly discuss its terrorism-related concerns with the Afghan Taliban both recommended that India should engage with the Taliban. Surprisingly, even Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States said, “India should talk to the Taliban if Delhi feels it will bolster [the] peace process.” Although Pakistan’s foreign office late denied such reports, the hurried denial displays Islamabad’s uneasiness at the idea of India’s potential rapprochement with the Taliban, which only goes to show the benefits such dialogue may yield. In fact, it appears that the Taliban itself is reaching out to initiate such discussions.
In view of these events and these comments, the Indian establishment is being forced to consider whether its long-standing policy of disengagement with the group may need a rethink. India’s first Chief of Defence Staff, General Rawat, for instance, is all for talking to the Taliban. And he may well have a point.
India’s long term strategic interests may just be too great to refuse talks and sit idly on the fence. Even the former Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, has implored New Delhi to engage with the Taliban so that it at least has some kind of place at the high table. However, the MEA, thus far, remains beholden to its line of an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” peace process, rejecting any process that doesn’t involve the Afghan government and continuing to oppose officially recognising the Taliban. Some reports have suggested that India has even been reaching out to different factions and groups within Afghanistan, like the Pashtuns and the Hazaras to try and cement a role for itself in the post-Afghan peace deal era. But, ultimately, without US forces there to keep the peace, India will undoubtedly find itself more exposed and less able to exert its influence. There are indications that the Taliban will hold greater influence over Afghan politics in the aftermath of US withdrawal from the region. At present, the Taliban already holds military control over large swathes of land. In the era following the Afghan peace deal, the power of the Afghan government may be further undermined. In such a situation, Pakistan may arise to prop the group to fill this power vacuum.
In the past, both India and Pakistan have supported different political groups in Afghanistan to suit their regional security interests. Pakistan remains closely allied with the Taliban, while India has supported forces that stand to neutralise or isolate the Taliban’s role in the country. In the 1980s, India forged an alliance with communist forces in Afghanistan alongside the Soviet Union. Similarly, in the 1990s, it backed the Northern Alliance, which fought a protracted war with the Taliban and had support from Iran and Russia. But today, as the balance of power has shifted back heavily towards the Taliban, India remains the only country to refrain from having any kind of dialogue with the Taliban. Hence, it is prudent to note the change in the Taliban’s stature internationally and the growing willingness of the US, Russia, and even of Iran, to hold talks with the Taliban. India must not ignore this shift, else it risks becoming a pariah that is out of touch of the changing geopolitics of the region.
Having said that, one can understand where the apprehensions of the Indian sides come from. For long, Afghan Taliban and its proxies continuously pledged to attack India and often publicly declared that the group cannot develop friendly ties with New Delhi unless the Kashmir issue is resolved. That being said, recent comments made by Taliban’s spokesperson appears to suggest a potential climbdown from the Taliban’s side.
Last week, Suhail Shaheen, the spokesman of the Taliban’s Doha-based Political Office, indirectly dismissed social media reports about the outfit’s opinion on the Kashmir issue, vowing to distance itself from the domestic affairs of other countries. By saying that “the Islamic Emirate has a clear policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries”, it might have indicated the possibility of respecting Indian red lines. He also went on to reject the idea that the Taliban is a proxy of any country, dismissing suggestions that the Taliban could act at the behest of Pakistan in Kashmir. Shaheen’s comments followed an earlier tweet on Sunday attributed to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, which said, “Muslims cannot be friends with kuffar (infidels). Until the Kashmir matter is not resolved; we will not be friends with India.”
At the outset, this is an encouraging view for voices in New Delhi that are interested in talking to the Taliban. Moreover, the clarification from the Taliban negates the view that Pakistan has overwhelming control over the Taliban. Furthermore, Shaheen also quickly rejected comments made by the deputy leader of the Taliban’s Political Office in Qatar, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, who had earlier accused India of playing a “negative role” inside Afghanistan. In fact, when asked about what should be India’s policy with Afghanistan, Shaheen candidly told the reporters that the Indian officials, who opposed engagement with the Taliban, were “following a failed policy”.
Part of India’s concern over the Taliban’s opinions, especially on Kashmir, stems from the fact that South Block still considers it a terror group. However, in the light of such comments, there is a case for establishing open lines of communication with the Taliban, even if through backchannel talks.
Even if these comments do not guarantee the Taliban’s genuineness and might be subject to change, ignoring them entirely will be naïve. It may very well be that the Taliban is attempting to undermine the support base of the Ashraf Ghani government and to weaken the current government in Kabul through outreach with India, which has historically only held dialogue with the Afghan government. But, with uncertainty surrounding the intra-Afghan talks amid growing violence, the situation demands a cautious yet open approach. India should ensure that it does not get marginalised in this strategically important country when a new dispensation comes to power, especially when it is crystal clear that, in the new governance structure, the Taliban is likely to share power with others.
Of course, New Delhi should be sceptical of the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan, which will have a significant impact on India’s decision to open talks with the group. While it is true that various sections of the Taliban’s old guard respects and continuously engage with Pakistan, and that their contacts with Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex are deep-rooted, things are changing. The group comprising of Mullah Baradar, the Haqqanis, and Mullah Haibatullah has been struggling to reign in their young field commanders and a new generation of insurgents whose motivations are often very local. Such divisions, which are now in the open, mean that there are points and issues on which their interests diverge and that they are not always in line with those of the Taliban. Also, to come to the conclusion that Pakistan today is in a postiont to control all these elements of the Taliban is an exaggerated assessment. Multiple reports suggest that the group has become increasingly critical of Pakistan’s way of handling the Taliban. Furthermore, its growing financial and diplomatic independence means that it is not entirely reliant on Pakistan as it was before.
While it’s expected that Islamabad and Rawalpindi may use its allies within the Taliban’s ranks to snub any such idea or reach out to other players, particularly the Haqqani Network, to disrupt the initiative, India must capitalize on this opportunity to increase its influence in the region. India can ensure that talks with Taliban hinge around the group’s position on militant groups that present a threat to India’s national security interests in the region.
For Pakistan, any idea of peace in Afghanistan must involve a process that doesn’t include any significant position for India. After having worked for decades to reduce New Delhi’s role even when the latter remained disengaged with the Taliban, how will Pakistani civil and military leadership react if Taliban-India talks make headway? There is always a possibility that Pakistan will exert pressure on the group to abandon any engagement policy. However, this may equally further estrange anti-Pakistan lobbies within the Taliban’s ranks in the future as their position within the country becomes more consolidated.
Also, India should also understand that although the power-sharing deal between Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani and his rival Abdullah Abdullah might be a welcome development, it also means that India’s prominent supporter will also see his authority diminish further in the whole process. This makes it even more critical for India to make sure that it doesn’t have all its eggs in one basket. This does not mean that New Delhi should abandon the government and side with the Taliban but only that it does not continue to rigidly cling on to hopes that Ghani will be able to give India its place at the high table.
As for the moral arguments for not talking to a terrorist entity like the Taliban, in the words of Former Ambassador Vivek Katju, “contacts and discussions do not mean acceptance of their ways or that their professions of not being Pakistan’s stooges should not have been tested”.
Image Source: The Quint