Due to the increasing convergence of strategic interests, it was widely believed that, having overcome the "hesitations of history", the Indo-US partnership would move towards a smooth and enduring alliance. However, with the US' 2020 presidential elections underway, there are growing signs of possible fractures that may emerge in this relationship should a Democratic candidate come into power, particularly Bernie Sanders.
While the US is closely and warily monitoring the intensifying and expanding divides in Indian society and politics, India, too, is keeping an eye on the raging internal struggles between the Republicans and the Democrats in the US and how the results of the elections could impact Indo-US relations.
As the possibility of a Bernie Sanders nomination grows with each passing day, with Pete Buttigieg having just dropped out of the race, the ramifications of a left-wing US president are now dawning on India and the world. India's right-wing government, under the leadership of the BJP's Narendra Modi, shares ideological similarities with the Republican Party of Donald Trump, and realises that Bernie Sanders would not be as ignorant or approving of its domestic policies and actions.
So what would a Bernie Sanders Presidency mean for India, and more importantly, how would a US President with a progressive foreign policy agenda interact with Modi's India?
Modi's government is sure to be uneasy with the prospect of a right-wing nationalist with a soft spot for India being replaced with a democratic socialist with human rights at the forefront of his foreign policy agenda. The Indian belief that a Republican-led US is friendlier to India than a potential Democrat-led one is primarily swayed by how this new progressive wing of the Democratic Party has indicated a desire to step away from the US' traditional position that Kashmir is India's internal issue.
When Modi visited the US and attended the now infamous 'Howdy Modi' event in Houston, Bernie Sanders penned an article titled, "As Trump Meets India's Modi, a reminder to put human rights at the center of US foreign policy". As the article was written back in September, when there were still several candidates in the running for the Democratic nomination, the article didn't receive much media attention in India. However, looking back now, it validates many of India's present fears and skepticism of a potential Sanders presidency, in which the US would take a stronger stance on Kashmir.
In the article, Sanders lambasts India for "unilaterally revoking Kashmir's longstanding autonomy" and takes a relatively moderate stance on Pakistan's role in fermenting cross-border terrorism, simply saying that Pakistan "often plays a bad role in Kashmir". A condemnation of Pakistan's actions is seen as one of the pillars of a strong relationship with Modi's government and nationalist forces in India, and thus Sanders' position could be seen as 'anti-India'. By seemingly letting Pakistan off the hook, Sanders' article gives credence to Indian beliefs that a progressive Democratic president will be detrimental to India's pursuit of its core national interests.
In addition, there is a perception that perhaps Sanders is not cognizant of the intricacies of India's relationship to Kashmir and Pakistan's looming and ominous presence, seen in his questioning attitude towards India's security concerns in the region. Sanders suggests that the Indian government uses the "garb of security" to advance perhaps more illicit intentions.
Further, Sanders hints at the need to internationalise the Kashmir issue through a "UN-backed peaceful resolution", which India would view as undermining its autonomy and sovereignty. India has always emphasised the need to follow the Shimla Agreement, which mandates that India and Pakistan must solve the dispute on a bilateral level.
Bipartisan support of India at Capitol Hill is receding under increasing pressure and criticism from progressives like Sanders. Democrats like Ilhan Omar, Rashida Talib, and Parmila Jayapal, all of whom have endorsed Sanders for President, have questions Modi's actions in Kashmir and religious freedoms in India. In fact, there have been multiple congressional hearings on Modi's decisions and the Hindu right in India, giving rise to the narrative the US is meddling in India's "internal affairs".
The growing assumptions made by sections of Indian and global commentators that Kashmir is up for global litigation is strikingly Nehruvian and is sure to strengthen Modi's position and support on the issue domestically. While some may consider that placing him in the company of Putin, Erdogan, MBS, and Bolsonaro will force him to retreat, Modi enjoys huge popular support for his position on Kashmir and is unlikely to submit to the wills and pressures from the global left.
Sanders is just in critiquing Trump's foreign policy as being bereft of values and one that renders the US into a transactional power. However, as the possibility of the presidential bid becomes greater, he must be careful in balancing his value-laden politics with maintaining traditional and vital allies and partners. For example, during the Democratic primary debate in Charleston, he called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a "reactionary racist" and declined to attend the AIPAC. Today's Bibi may be tomorrow's Modi.
When political pressure and cautions morph into personal disputes and name-calling, the frameworks of decades-long alliances and partnerships are threatened by senseless bridge-burning. Alienating leaders of allied countries by indulging in public sparring is futile and counter-productive to maintaining working relationships.
While it may be politically tempting and even accurate to denounce the alleged problematic policies and practices of populist leaders, Sanders must be wary of the potential backlash and costs.
That being said, Sanders is not alone in raising concerns about recent developments in India. For all his support and praise of Modi, Trump acknowledged discussing discussing "religious freedom" with the Indian PM. While he outwardly seemed convinced with Modi's answer and expressed confidence in his leadership, both the Chairs of India Caucus, Mark Warner, and John Cornyn expressed the administration's concerns of the "recent violence in New Delhi". Similarly, the Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee was "deeply troubled with the communal violence," adding, "the right to protest is a key aspect in democracy, but they must remain peaceful, and police must ensure the safety for all."
Hence, while Sanders is uniquely critical of India in a manner that Trump is not, BJP's establishment must also be equally cautious of overextending itself domestically and threatening its relationship with the US, even if Trump were to maintain his incumbency. Moreover, by increasing the intensity of its retaliation against political dissent, it may threaten crucial military aid and trade in defense equipment, particularly under Sanders. Sanders has already put Israel and Saudi Arabia on the list for misbehavior and violation of human rights.
Simultaneously, however, the US must consider the risks and rewards of such a policy. At a time where Asia is seeing an asymmetrical military build-up tipping the balance of power in favour of China, constraining India's strategic and military capacity would severely undermine the US' Indo-Pacific geopolitical strategy.
The form of isolationism mooted by Sanders may serve to embolden Chinese transgressions in the region. In viewing every military action as an act of war and every firm stance against an adversary as a potential spark for escalation, left-wing isolationism and restraint may destabilise the region further and cause countries like India to feel betrayed by a lack of US support.
Despite Sanders claiming that he will use force when needed and that he is not a pacifist, domestic compulsions and pressures from the progressive base could lead him to be reluctant to use American military power abroad. However, by and large, the minutiae of foreign policy remain blurry. While he speaks frequently of the ills of American adventurism, he is not the first to espouse a value-laden foreign policy. He is yet to explain how he will balance diplomacy with the credible use of force. The question on how will Sanders reconcile the choice between waging the struggle against autocrats and cutting the defense budget and deemphasizing military power has no answers as of now.
This leads into the critique that Sanders' approach to world affairs presently resembles a rambling Noam Chomsky lecture rather than a presidential candidate's clear and concise plan. While Sanders may have no intention of transferring his campaign rhetoric into literal policies while in the White House, his willingness to criticize vital allies and endanger crucial partnerships is a cause of concern for both American and Indian strategists.
Modi, too, needs to be wary of putting all his eggs in one basket by betting on Trump's return. India does not have to get caught in the crossfire between the two parties and the polarization plaguing American politics. Erosion of bipartisan support is real, proved by the fact that the first bipartisan resolution, introduced by Congresswoman Jayapal, has now got 63 lawmakers' signatures. New Delhi and the Indian right in general, must awaken to the tangible damage its nationalistic agenda is doing to its global image and reputation. By burning bridges with key foreign actors, its actions are sure to affect its soft power capabilities in the short run and its core interests in the long run by reducing its diplomatic and political capital and potentially reduce its strategic and military capacity, strength, and maneuverability.
Reference List
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