Will the Hijab Row Dent India’s Relations With Muslim Countries?

In the past, differences on religious matters between India and its OIC allies have resulted in nothing more than minor diplomatic skirmishes.

March 1, 2022
Will the Hijab Row Dent India’s Relations With Muslim Countries?
Students protesting against the hijab ban introduced by some schools in Karnataka, citing violation of religious freedom and expression. 
IMAGE SOURCE: TIMES OF INDIA

The recent hijab ban in the Indian state of Karnataka has stirred controversy and deepened the rift between regional and political factions in the country. Crucially, however, it has also attracted global condemnation, drawing concern about whether the row could impact India’s relatively stable and friendly relations with its allied Islamic nations.

The hijab controversy first began back in January after a government-affiliated college in Karnataka’s Udupi district barred six Muslim girls from attending classes because they were wearing headscarves. The college had banned hijabs late last year, asserting that they violate school uniform rules. The ensuing debates and deliberations between protesting students and the college administration failed, and in fact resulted in more colleges around the state instituting identical bans on their campuses. 

As a result, what started as a dispute at one college soon reached Karnataka’s High Court and sparked a nationwide protest that reflects the communal differences that have come to define India in recent times. While a number of saffron-clad Hindu students have opposed the hijab by arguing that the same uniform code must be applied for all, Muslim students have replied that a hijab ban constitutes a violation of their religious freedom. Moreover, although the Court has c
onstituted a three-judge bench to review the matter, it has in the meantime banned students from wearing religious clothing, including the hijab and saffron shawls, until it delivers a verdict.

As the crisis deepens, the world’s eyes have turned to India in shock, with various international actors—such as the United States, Pakistan, Kuwait, Bangladesh, and Bahrain—and human rights groups and activists condemning India for the persecution of Muslims and “objectification”, “marginalisation”, and “stigmatisation” of Muslim girls and women. 

In response to this outcry, a spokesperson for the ruling Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), Smriti Hartis, told
Al Jazeera: “The concept of uniform is to avoid discrimination between students. There is neither place for hijab nor saffron scarves in educational institutes.” Hartis further called the Muslim girls’ demand for hijab an “unnecessary controversy.” 

Likewise, External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi retorted, “Our constitutional framework and mechanisms, as well as our democratic ethos and polity, are the context in which issues are considered and resolved. Motivated comments on our internal issues are not welcome.”

However, whether or not such comments are welcome, they are nonetheless being made, and have drawn questions about how long India can keep the concerns of its allied Islamic nations at bay.

In fact, on February 14, the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a group of 57 Muslim majority countries, released an official statement stating: “The General Secretariat of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) expresses deep concern over recent public calls for genocide of Muslims by the ‘Hindutva’ proponents in Haridwar in the State of Uttarakhand and reported incidents of harassment of Muslim women on social media sites as well as banning of Muslim girl students from wearing hijab in the State of Karnataka.” The Organization also condemned the targeting of Muslim places of worship and anti-Muslim legislation in different states, arguing that they indicate growing Islamophobia in India. 

In response, India accused the OIC of employing a communal mindset and furthering nefarious propaganda against India.

The OIC’s concerns have also been individually echoed by some of its members. For example, some Kuwaiti parliamentarians urged the government to ban the entry of any member of the ruling BJP party.  

Once again, however, India appeared nonplussed, with its embassy in Kuwait saying that bilateral relations with Kuwait remain firm and that any indications otherwise are the work of “anti-India elements,” pointing to opposition politicians in India such as Congress Party MP Shashi Tharoor.

Yet, a similar incident took place in Bahrain, where 23 MPs
 rebuked the Hijab ban and urged their government to pressure India into ending the discriminatory decision. 

Therefore, while India may be eager to attribute opposition from the global Islamic community to the “nefarious” work of its opposition politicians and usual suspects such as Turkey and Pakistan, the controversy in Karnataka has also generated anger in allied nations such as
 Iran, Bangladesh, and Indonesia.

However, while there are evidently elements within these countries that have been angered by the hijab row, will this latest controversy really be the tipping point in India’s relations with its Islamic allies?

In recent years, India has also drawn criticism for other policies that have been interpreted as Islamophobic, such as the Citizen Amendment Act (CAA). Following the riots in New Delhi back in December 2019 over the CAA, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei said, “The hearts of Muslims all over the world are grieving over the massacre of Muslims in India. The govt of India should confront extremist Hindus & their parties & stop the massacre of Muslims in order to prevent India’s isolation from the world of Islam.”

Likewise, the Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamed questioned the necessity of the CAA, saying people are dying because of the Act. Prior to this, Mohamed also slammed the Indian government for revoking Article 370, which granted the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir special status, and said India had invaded and occupied Kashmir.

Even Bangladesh, one of India's closest allies in South Asia, criticised the Indian government over the CAA and called it unnecessary. Its foreign minister and home minister even cancelled their visits to New Delhi over the legislation.

Along these same lines, the Indonesian foreign ministry summoned the Indian ambassador to Jakarta to discuss the Delhi riots.

Similarly, during the early days of the pandemic, a member of the UAE royal family, Hend al-Qassimi, warned of racist and discriminatory treatment against Muslims in India, who were held disproportionately responsible for spreading COVID-19 and described as “human bombs” following the Tablighi Jamaat superspreader event. Yet, just last week, the two countries signed a $100 billion free trade agreement. 

In fact, beyond the initial scathing remarks and India’s usual warnings against interference in its internal affairs, these minor scuffles have had little impact on India’s broader, long-term ties with OIC countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bangladesh, and the Maldives. Moreover, a number of OIC countries have gone out of their way in their refusal to publicly condemn India for its treatment of its Muslim community. 

In 2020, at an OIC summit, the Maldives thwarted a Pakistani diplomatic attack over India’s treatment of minorities and rising Islamophobia. The Maldives said it was incorrect to single out India over alleged Islamophobia, as it undermines religious harmony in South Asia. It added that the disinformation campaign on social media does not represent the feelings of 1.3 billion Indians. The ruling government in Male has also stood firmly by India’s side during the escalating #IndiaOut protests within its own borders, urging citizens not to endanger ties with a critical ally. 

Likewise, despite earlier threatening to isolate India from Arab countries, Iran invited India to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Additionally, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, wherein the pair agreed to boost economic cooperation and discussed Afghanistan, the 2015 nuclear deal, and the use of Chabahar port. They also discussed the possibility of a preferential trade agreement.

Similarly, despite rocky relations with Bangladesh over Dhaka’s condemnation of the CAA, India set aside $39 million as development aid for Bangladesh in its 2022-2023 union budget.

Saudi Arabia, too, announced a $15 billion purchase by the country’s state-owned Aramco in India’s Reliance oil and chemicals business. Besides this, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman further announced investments worth $100 billion in India by 2021.

In a similar vein, while it may not directly relate to India’s treatment of its Muslim community, Islamic allies have also refused to wade in on the Kashmir controversy, insisting that it is an issue for India to resolve either on its own or in collaboration with Pakistan. When India revoked Article 370, most Gulf countries remained silent, owing to a large number of Indian expatriates living in the Arab countries and more than $100 billion in annual trade with India. The UAE, in fact, sided with India and called it the country’s “internal matter.” In fact, UAE’s ambassador to India, Ahmed al-Banna, even went as far as to claim that the changes in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir promote stability and peace and improve social justice and security. 

Therefore, while opposition politicians like Shashi Tharoor have warned and insisted that “domestic actions have international repercussions,” recent history certainly suggests otherwise. Admittedly,
tensions between India and its Islamic allies across the globe have risen in recent years. In this respect, taking a firm stand against violations of religious freedoms and the persecution of minorities can only help India remain in good standing with its Islamic allies. Moreover, it would also signal its commitment to upholding its constitutional and ethical responsibilities and more generally cement its rise as a Vishwaguru. However, expecting such a seismic shift in the rhetoric and policymaking of the ruling party may be unrealistic. Moreover, New Delhi has little reason to bring about such a transformative change to its approach when it appears virtually assured that it can count on the support of its Islamic allies no matter what. Therefore, although there have been whispers that the ongoing hijab row could result in tangible costs to India’s relations with OIC allies, it is unlikely to be the kind of tipping point that some have suggested it could be. 

Author

Anchal Agarwal

Former Writer